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Contracts, Breach of-Telegraph Companies-Delayin YansmittingMessage.
C left a despatch at defendant's telegraph office in S., to be forwarded,
to plaintiff at M. The despatch was "Strauss gone to Howard. Gaveman gold watch bi mistake. Left no word with me.. Store dosed.
Answer." Strauss was a clerk whom plantiff had-left in charge of'his
jewelry store in his absence, and during the night or early in the morning
before the despatch was sent had robbed the store and absconded witit
the property, and the despatch was in relation to theabsconding, but.
defendant's agent lad no notice thereof.' The despatch remained in the
S. office an hour and was then forwarded to the M. office, where it remained two hours before it was delivered, or any effort made fo deliverit. On receiving the despatch, plaintiff had further communication with
C, and then went to S, where he ascertained the fact of the robbery.
After telegraphing to various points for the arrest ofStrauss, plaintiff.
* went to P, and waited several hours for answers, but, receiving none,
went on to D, leaving-no address at P. After his departure, despatches.
announcing the arrest of Strauss, with the property in his possession,
reached P, but as they could not be forwarded to plaintiff, they remained
unanswered; and the sheriff, hearing nothing from plaintiff, had to discharge Strauss. When subsequently re-arrested he had disposed of most
of-thegoods. Held, that plaintiffcould not recover more than the cost of'
the message and incidental expenses, upon the prinviple that where twopersons have made a contract, .which one of them has broken, thedamages which the other party ought to receive in respect to such breach
of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered:
either arising' naturally, i. e., according to the usual course of things,
from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they'
made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.
Held, further, that the defendant was not liable, because the robbery
was prior to the sending of the message to plaintiff; and, also, becausethe plaintiff had been negligent in leaving no address at P.
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In the above case the decision
is placed upon three distinct
grounds:
First.-The operator had no notice, either from the wording of
the telegram or from anything that
the sender told him, that a loss
would result from a failure to transmit and deliver the message
promptly.
Second.-The. loss of the goods
had occurred before the telegram
was sent, and hence could not be
ascribed to any failure of duty on
the company's part.
Tkird.-The plaintiff's failure to
recover his property was due to his
own negligence in leaving no address at Pueblo, so that the despatches stating the arrest of the
thief and the recovery of the goods
failed to reach him.
Taking these reasons in inverse
order, the last is so indisputable
that it is hard to see why the Court
rested the decision on any other
ground. The soundness of the
second reason-that even if the
company had been negligent, the
loss was not due to this fact, but to
the crime of- Strauss-may be seriously doubted; for the question
was not whether the telegram, if
delivered promptly, could have
prevented the goods from being
stolen in the first instance, but
whether the delay prevented their
recovery.
The non-recovery of
the goods, not the theft of them,
was the injury for which the plaintiff sought to hold the company
liable. As, however, this second
reason was not essential to the decision, its correctness is of no practical importance here.
The first reason %%as equally unnecessary to the decision of the

case, "butit touches an interesting
point of the law of communication
by telegraph, viz., the liability of
a telegraph company for the consequences of delay in the transmission or delivery of a message
of whose importance the company
is ignorant.
It may here be mentioned incidentally that it is now regarded as
settled in the United States that
the measure of damages is the same
whether the action is brought by
the sender or the receiver of a
message, and whether it is in contract or in tort: Gray on Communication by Telegraph,
8o; 2
Sedgwick on Damages, 8th ed., f
878 ; see W. U. Tel. Co,v. Adams,
75 Texas, 531; W. U. Tel. Co. v.
Beringer, 84 Texas, 28.
No distinction seems ever to have
been taken between the liability of
a telegraph company for mistakes
in the transmission of a message
and its liability for delay; yet it is.
clearly much more reasonable to
take the company's knowledge or
ignorance of the meaning and importance of a message into account
in the one case than in the other,
for while such ignorance cannot
possibly occasion delay, it may
greatly increase the risk of error,
it being obvious that a mistake is
much less likely to be made, or if
made, to remain undetected, when
the words of a telegram convey a
clear impression of its meaning or,
as the phrase is, "make sense,"
than when they do not. In the
present note, therefore, in reviewing the principal cases on liability
for delay as affected by knowledge
or ignorance, cases on liability for
mistake will be referred to only
by way of illustration, and not
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-cited as authority. Thereasonableness of the decisions in the former
class of cases can be %estjudged of
by keeping the two classes distinct
A well-known line Pf cas~s holds
that the damages for the delay of a
telegram cannotexceedthe amount
which the telegraph company
might, from such knowledge of
the purpose of the telegram as
could he gathered from its language, or was imparted to the
operator, naturally expect would
follow .from such delay. Thus in
Itahdsberger v. Mag. Tel. Co., 2
Barb. (N. Y.), 530 (i86o), where the
despatch was, "Get ten thousand
dollars of the MIil Company," it
was held that the only consequence
of delay fo be naturally expected
was the plaintitfPs inability to obtaii the money during the period
of the delay, and that the measure
-of damages was the interest on the
money for that period and the sum
paid for the despatch. The plaintiff's losses through inability to
carry out a certain contract, on
account of not having the money
in time; were held to be something
outside the natural contemplation
of the telegraph company and,
therefore, not recoverable.
This decision is avowedly based
on the rule of damages- laid down
iii iiffln v. Colver, 16 N. Y., 489.
Suit Was there brought for delay in
completing a steam engine ordered
for the plaintiff's planing mill, and
it was held that "the damages
must be such as may fairly be supposed to have entered into the contemplation -of the parties when
they made the contract, that is,
such as might naturally be expected to follow its'violation." The
same rule is adhered to in the cases
which follow Landsberger v. Mag.
Tel. Co., though it is more usually

referred to as the rule in Hadley v.
Baxendale, 9 Amxch., 341. The rule
is there expressed somewhat differently, the damages (in that case
for A carrier's delay in delivering
goods) being stated as "such as
may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally,
i. e., according to the usual course
of things, from 'such breach of
contract itself, or such as may
reasonably be supposed to have*
been in the contemplation of the
parties at the time they made the
contract, as the probable result of
the breach of iL." In other words,
damages for the . natural- consequences of delay are allowed in all
cases, while if the onsequences of
delay be -magnified by the special
circumstances of the case, damages
are recoverable only in so far as
the defendant Vnew or ought to
have known what those special circumstances were. The -two statements would seem, however, to
cover the same ground, for every
man is held in law to contemplate
the natural (i. e., ordinary or usual)
results of his breach of contract,
while, to the extent to'which he is
informed of the special circumstances of the contract, other consequences also will be to him
"such as might naturally be expected to follow its violation."
The decision 1fn Landsberger v.
Mag. Tel. Co., and its application
of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale,
have been cited and followed in
several cases. Thus, in U. S. Tel.
Co. v. Gildersleeve, 29 Md., 232
(1868), an order to sell $5o,ooo in
gold had been sent" in the words
"sell fifty gold." This would have
been understood by the addressee
or any broker, but was not explained to the operator. The jury
was instructed that the plaintiff was
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entitled to recover the full amount
of his loss from the decline in gold
after the time the message should
have arrived, but the Court- of
Appeal reversed the judgmentland
said, "' Sell fifty gold' may have
been understood in its literal import, if it can be properly said to
have any, or was as likely to be
taken to mean fifty dallars as fifty
thousand dollars by those not initi.ated. And if the measure of responsibility at all depends upon a
knowledge of the special circumstances of the case, it would certainly follow that the nature of this
despatch should have been communicated to the agent at the time
it was offered to be sent, in order
that the appellant might have observed the precautions necessary to
guard itself against the risk."
In Baldwin v. U. S. Tel. Co., 45
N. Y., 744 (i87x), an inquiry about
an oil well was delayed, so that the
plaintiff sold his interest for much
less than he could have got had
the message arrived in time. Suit
having been brought for the
amountof the difference, it was held
that whatever might have been the
purpose in sending the telegram,
the company "had no knowledge
or means of knowledge of it, and
could not have contemplated either
a loss of a sale, or a sale at an
under value, or any other disposition of or dealing with the well
or any other property, as the probable or possible result of a breach
of its contract. The loss which
would, naturally and necessarily,
result from the failure to deliver
the message, would be the money
paid for its transmission, ahd no
other damages can be claimed upon
the evidence as resulting from the
alleged breach of duty by the defendant."
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In Candee v. IV. U. Tel. Co., 34
Wis., 471 (1874), the message contained an order, in cipher, to buy
250 shares of a certain stock. The
court held that only the price paid
for the telegram could be recovered, saying: "It cannot be
said or assumed that any amount
of damages or any pecuniary loss
or injury will naturally ensue or be
suffered according to the usual
course of things from the failure to
transmit a message, the meaning
and import of which are wholly
unknown to the operator. The
operator... cannot be supposed to,
look upon such a message as one
pertaining to transactionsof pecuniary value and importance, and in
respect of which pecuniary loss or
damages will naturally arise i4
case of his failure or.omission to.
send it."
In Mackay z'. W. U. Telegraph
Co., x6 Nev., 222 (1881), the message was a cipher order to sell certain mining stock. The Court
held, on the authority of the decisions in the other States, "that
unless the importance of the message is shown, either by its own
terms or by explanation made to
the person receiving it in behalf of
the telegraph company, no damages are recoverable for failure or
delay in transmission beyond the
price paid for the purpose," and
that the admission of the defendant's manager, that he generally
supposed such despatches related
to stocks or mining business, was
insufficient to impose any liability
on the company.
The same view of the law has
been held in Dorgan v. V. U. Tel.
Co. (C. C., S. D., Ala., 1874), i Am.
L. T. N. S., 4o6 (a cipher despatch);
McColl v. same, 12 J. & S. (N. Y.),
407 (1879): Daniel v. same, 6i Tex.,
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(x874, a cipher despatch). Also
in Kinghorne v. same, x8 U. C. Q.
B., 6o; All. Tel. Cas.,198 (1859);
Stevenson v. Mont. Tel. Co.,, i8
U. C. Q. B., 6o; All. Tel. Cas. 7
(I858), Beauprd zr. Pac. & At. Tel.
Co., 21 Minn., 155 (1874); Bank v.
W. U, Tel. Co:, 300 St, 355 (187,6);
Behm v. same, 8 Bis., 131 (1879).;
W. U. Tel. Co. v. Hall, 124 U. S.,
444 (1887)! Cahn v. W. U. Tel. Co.,
48 Fed.- R., 81o; in which cases,
however, the remarks of..the Court
were obiter, the decisions being, in
each instance, that the plaintiff's
case lacked even the evidence.
required by his own view of the
law.
If a telegraph conipany's liability
for delay depends on its knowledge
of the meaning of the message
delayed, it would seem only logical
that the liability should be in proportion to the knowledge, and
hence not only that where a messake indicates that a certain loss
will result from -delay, and a
greater loss really results, the company will be liable for the loss indicated only (e. g., see Landsberger
v. Mag. Tel. Co., szu!pra; Reliance
Lumber Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 58
Tex., 394), but also that the liability should be greater where the
company is informed both as to
the character and amount of the
probable loss than when the former
only is known, and still greater than
when neither is known, but only
that delay may- cause a loss. In
.'point of fact, as admitted in "Gray
on Communication by Telegraph,"
* 84-86, the liability is held to be
precisely the same in all three
classes of cases, and for the very
practical reason that when once the
liability for a loss due to delay is
admitted, the damages must be
assessed by that loss and not by the
452

company's degree-of knowledge of
what that loss would be. - This
failure to carry out the rule to its
logical consequences is illustrated
in the following cases:
In Parks .v.Alta California Tel.
Co., 13 Cal., 422 (1859), the despatch was "Due i8oo; attach if
you can find property; will send
note by to-morrow's stage." It
was held that the plaintiff should
have been allowed to prove that
the attachment could have been
made and the debt -recovered but
for the delay of the telegram, in
order to recover damages for such
delay, as he "had a right to have
his message sent decording to contract." This case.wag followed in
Bryant v. Am.Tel. Co., i Daly (N.
Y., I865), 575, where, however,
the plaintiff's position was even
stronger, the importance of the
message (which also concerns an
attachment) having been impressed
on the operator.
In Birney v. N. Y. & Washington Tel. Co., I8Md., 341 (1862), the
message was an order to sell certain shares of stock, and it was
held that the defendant was "a
party contracting to perform a service, within the sphere of its business, for compensation, which it
fails to perform, and, for such failure, must account for any loss or
injury that results from its neglect;
und such loss or injuiy will be the
measure of damages to which the
plaintiff is entitled."
In U. S. Tel. Co. v. Wenger, 55
Pa., 252 (1867), the message clearly
indicated an order to buy a certain
number of shares of certain stock
at a certain limit of price, and the
failure to buy at the market price
when the telegram should have arrived was held to have.been within
the contemplation of the company
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as the natural result of any delay,
so that the case was distinguished
from Landsberger z.Mag. Tel. Co.,
and the company held liable.
In Squire v. W. U. Tel. Co., 98
Mass., 232 (1867), the message "on
its face purported to be an acceptance of an order to sell merchandise." It was held that "the agreement was to transmit and deliver it
with reasonable diligence and dispatch," that "the natural consequence of a failure to fulfill the
contract was thatthe party to whom
the message was addressed, not receiving a reply to his offer to sell
the merchandise in due season,
would dispose of it to another person ;" so the plaintiff might have
to buy at a higher price, and that
for any loss thereby occasioned to
the plaintiff the defendant would be
liable.
In W. U. Tel. Co.. v. Graham, i
Col., 23o (1871), the message delayed
was, "Ship oil soon as possible, at
very best rate you can," and the
plaintiff was allowed to recover the
increased.price of freight that he
had had to pay and all expenses
that he hadincurred from the delay,
but not the profits that he would
have realized from an early sale of
the oil.
- In True v. Int.Tel. Co., 6o Me.,
9 (x872), the message was, "Ship
cargo named at ninety; if you can
secure freight at ten, wire us results." The company was held liable for the plaintiff's loss of profits,
such loss being the immediate and
necessary result of the delay, and
being fairly presumed to have been
in the contemplation of the parties.
In Manville v. W. U. Tel. Co.,
37 Ia., 214 (18791, the message was,
"Ship your hogs at once," and the
company was held liable for the
plaintiff's failure to sell his hogs at
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the price he could have obtained
had he received the telegram without unreasonable delay.
In Sprague v. W. U. Tel. Co., 6
Daly (N. Y.), 20- (1875), the message was, "Hold my case till Tuesday or Thursday; please reply,"
and its importance was explained
.to the operator. The plaintiff was
allowed to recover the cost of his
own and his counsel's journey to
Buffalo and back, and the fee paid
his counsel forgoing, as thejourney
was needless and would not have
been taken had the message been
sent and answered. It was also held
in New York (Rittenhouse v. Ind.,
Tel., 44N. Y., 263 (1870), that asthe
operator could inquire the meaning
of any message, the fact that it was
not intelligible to ordinary persons
did not relieve the company for liability for its correct trasmission.
In V. U. Tel. Co. v. Fenton, 52
Ind. i (1875), and Same v. McKibben, 114 Ind., 511 (1887), the messages bad offered work at a certain
rate of wages, and plaintiffs were
allowed to recover at that rate for
the time they were out of work,
although in the former case there
was nothing to show that the wages
were monthly and not for the whole
time of service.
In Thompson v. W. U.-Tel. Co.,
64 Wis., 531 (1885), the message
was, "Sendbayhorseto-day. Mock
loads to-night." It was held that
as Mock was a well-known horse
dealer, the company's agent must
be taken to know the fact, there
being no evidence to the contrary,
so that "this telegram fairly conveyed the idea to the agent that this
horse was wanted that day at Boscobel for the purpose of sale to
Mock," and the company was held
liable for ,.e loss of the sale.
In Mowry v. W%.
U. Tel. Co., 5I

R.FPONSIBILITY FOR DIEAY

Hun. (N. Y.), 126 (1889), and-W.
U. Tel. Co. v. Bowen, 84 Tem. 476
(:892), the messages were acce'ptances of contracts, and the defendant was in each case held liable
for the loss of the' contract oii the
ground that the offer having been
made-through it, it was chargeable
with' all the knowledge conveyed
by both dispatches, as- also, in the
latter case,- with the operator's personai~kfowledge of the plaintiff's.
business.
In W. U. Tel. Co. v. Brown, 84
Tex., 54" (1892), the plaintiff had

sent an agent to Kansas'City to buy
mules, and'the latter, having made
a conditional purchase, telegraphed
'he
Kansas City dnd St. Louis
prices, askifig instructions. The
message was not delivered till it
had been repeated, and. the pur*lse eventually cost more. The
damages were.measured at the differtiice between the price 6f the
mules which the agent conditionally agreed to pay, and the higher
price which he would have had to
pay at the time an answer- to the
repeated telegram might have been
sent. Moreover, the plaintiff, before the hearing from his agent
had contracted to sell some of the
mules he expected to purchase, and
he was allowed to recover the difference between the price at which
.he could have bought them had the
telegram been delivered and that
at whicb he had contracted to sell
them, less the cost of transporta.tion.
It is to be observed that in some
* of these cases the liability of a telegraph company is based rather on
its duty to transmit all messages
promptly than on its knowledge of
their importance, and aiso that some
of them seem to recognize a broader.
measure of liability than that laid

down in Landsberger v. Mag. Tel.
Co., and a tendency to depart from
the strict ruliig of that case. The
following seems to be a fair statement of the view taken tb-day by
the courts that 'make liability
depend on knowledge, although
the case was one of error in transmission, not of delay:
"It is not easy to state a case in
which it can be said the partiescontemplated, at the time of contracting, all the damages.which
will probably result from a failureto .perform the contract. We think
• the reasonable rule, and one well
sustained by authority, is that
Where a'message as, writtpn, read
inthelight of well-known usage in.
commercial correspondence, reasonably iiiforms the 6perhtor that"the message is one of 'business
importance, and 4isloses the trans_.action so far as is necessary to
accomplish the purpose -for which
- it
'issent, the com1paxiy should.
be held liable for all the direct
damages resulting from a negligent
failure to transmit it as written,
within a reasonable time, unless.
such- negligence is-in some way
excused."
Postal T. C. Co. v..
Lathrop, 131 fll., 575 (189O).
It is not surprising, however,
that other courts have gone further,
for while the limitation of- the
liability of a telegiaph company by
its actual or constructive knowledge of the importance of the message entrusted to: it was natural'
enough in the infancy of telegraphy,
before it had become-so essential a
factor in the every-day method of
conducting business, and the invention had reached its present degree
of perfection and the operators their
present skill, yet in the course of
time the necessity for holding telegraph companies to a strict per-
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formance of their duty has become
more evident. It is now recognized
that the skill of the operators and
the excellence of the instruments is
such that mistake and delay are
not excusable, and mean negligence, and also that the public
character of telegraph companies
and their exercise of the right of
eminent domain involve, as a matter of public policy, liability corresponding to the privileges. See
Brown v. Postal T. C. Co. (N. Car.,
X892), 16 S. R. Rep., 179, overruling Lassiter v. TeL Co., 89 N. C.,
334Even in 1865 Prof. Dwight wrote
(4 AmERiCAN LAW REGISTER,
N. S., 203): "The rule in Hadley v.
Baxendale is very severe in its application to the senders of telegraphic messages. It is almost
impossible, in many cases, to communicate the result of a neglect to
dispatch the message. Since it has
been settled that the condition requiring an important message to
be repeated for an additional price
is valid, it is worthy of consideration whether the telegraph company should not be held responsible
for all the direct consequences following its neglect of duty, without
reference to the question whether
they have been contemplated by
the parties or not." So in Scott
andJarnagin on the Law of Telegraphs, U 4o4-4o6 (I868), the impracticability of fully informing
the operator as to the consequences
-ofdelay, and the fact that the companies hold themselves out to the
-ublic as prepared at all times, and
for all persons, to transmit important messages, are dwelt upoh, and
it is urged that the damages which
"may be fairly supposed to have
-entered into the contemplation of
the parties," ought not to depend

on the company's knowledge of the
meaning of the telegram, but on
their undertaking to trknsmit all
messages, the most important hs
well as the most trivial, correctly
and promptly.
So in 2 Redfield on Railways, 35o
(6th ed.), it is said that the secrecy
and reserve with which telegraphic
correspondence is commonly conducted cannot affect the companies'
liability, because they can ask for
information if they choose.
The dissatisfaction expressed by
these writers with the ruling in
Landsberger v. Mag. Tel. Co., and
the cases which follow it, has of
late been shared by the courts of
some States, and they have accordingly held that the liability of a telegraph company does not depend,
on the knowledge the operator-may
have of the contents of the message, and that the duty of prompt
transmission, and the liability for
the proximate results of the delay
of a message'of whose meaning the
company knows little or nothing,
and even of a message in cipher;
are the same as if its contents had
been either evident from its ianguage or fully communicated:
Daugherty v. Am. U. Tel. Co., 75
Ala., 168; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Way,

83 Ala.,

542;

same v. Hyer, 22 Fla.,

637; same v. Fatman, 73 Ga., 285;
same v. Weiting. i Tex. App., Civ.
Cas., 444; same v. Reynolds, 77
Va., 173; and see same v. Fontaine,
58 Ga., 45; same v. Lindley (Ga.),

i5 S. E. Rep., 636.
In the Alabama cases the opifiions disclaim all intention of departing from the rule in Hadley v.
Baxendale, but suggest that that
rule has been misapplied, and that
the failure to make the sales or
purchases, or to secure the other
benefits which the sending of the

